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Abstract
Microeconomic flexibility, by facilitating the process of creative-destruction, is at the core
of economic growth in modern market economies.  The main reason for why this process is not
infinitely fast is the presence of adjustment costs, some of them technological, others institutional.
Chief among the latter is labor market regulation.  While few economists would object to such a
view, its empirical support is rather weak.  In this paper we revisit this hypothesis and find strong
evidence for it.  We use a new sectoral panel for 60 countries and a methodology suitable for such
a panel.  We find that job security regulation clearly hampers the creative-destruction process,
especially in countries where regulations are likely to be enforced.  Moving from the 20
th to the 80
th
percentile in job security, in countries with strong rule of law, cuts the annual speed of adjustment
to shocks by a third while shaving off about one percent from annual productivity growth.  The same
movement has negligible effects in countries with weak rule of law.
Keywords: Microeconomic rigidities, creative-destruction, job security regulation, adjustment
costs, rule of law, productivity growth
JEL Codes: E24, J23, J63, J64, K001 Introduction
Microeconomic ﬂexibility, by facilitating the ongoing process of creative-destruction, is at the core of eco-
nomic growth in modern market economies. This basic idea has been with economists for centuries, was
brought to the fore by Schumpeter ﬁfty years ago, and has recently been quantiﬁed in a wide variety of con-
texts.1 In US Manufacturing, for example, more than half of aggregate productivity growth can be directly
linked to this process.2
The main obstacle faced by microeconomic ﬂexibility is adjustment costs. Some of these costs are
purely technological, others are institutional. Chief among the latter is labor market regulation, in partic-
ular job security provisions. The literature on the impact of labor market regulation on the many different
economic, political and sociological variables associated to labor markets and their participants is extensive
and contentious. However, the proposition that job security provisions reduce restructuring is a point of
agreement.
Despite this consensus, the empirical evidence supporting the negative impact of labor market regulation
on microeconomic ﬂexibility has been scant at best. This is not too surprising, as the obstacles to empiri-
cal success are legions, including poor measurement of restructuring activity and labor market institutions
variables, both within a country and more so across countries. In this paper we make a new attempt. We
develop a methodology that allows us to bring together the extensive new data set on labor market regula-
tion constructed by Djankov et al. (2003) with comparable cross-country cross-sectoral data on employment
and output from the UNIDO (2002) data-set. We also emphasize the key distinction between effective and
ofﬁcial labor market regulation.
The methodology builds on the simple partial-adjustment idea that larger adjustment costs are reﬂected
in slower employment adjustment to shocks.3 The accumulation of limited adjustment to these shocks
builds a wedge between frictionless and actual employment, which is the main right hand side variable in
this approach. We propose a new way of estimating this wedge, which allows us to pool data on labor market
legislation with comparable employment and output data for a broad range of countries. As a result, we are
able to enlarge the effective sample to 60 economies, more than double the country coverage of previous
studies in this literature.4 Our attempt to measure effective labor regulation interacts existing measures of
job security provision with measures of rule of law and government efﬁciency.
Our results are clear and robust: countries with less effective job security legislation adjust more quickly
to imbalances between frictionless and actual employment. In countries with strong rule of law, moving
from the 20th to the 80th percentile of job security lowers the speed of adjustment to shocks by 35 percent
and cuts annual productivity growth by 0:86 percent. The same movement for countries with low rule of law
1See, e.g., the review in Caballero and Hammour (2000).
2See, e.g., Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998).
3For surveys of the empirical literature on partial-adjustment see Nickell (1986) and Hammermesh (1993).
4To our knowledge, the broadest cross-country study to date – Nickell and Nuziata (2000) – included 20 high income OECD
countries. Other recent studies, such as Burgess and Knetter (1998) and Burgess et al. (2000), pool industry-level data from 7
OECD economies.
1only reduces the speed of adjustment by approximately 1 percent and productivity growth by 0.02 percent.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology and describes the new data set.
Section 3 discusses the main results and explores their robustness. Section 4 gauges the impact of effective
labor protection on productivity growth. Section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology and Data
2.1 Methodology
2.1.1 Overview
The starting point for our methodology is a simple adjustment hazard model, where the change in the
number of (ﬁlled) jobs in sector j in country c between time t ¡1 and t is a probabilistic (at least to the
econometrician) function of the gap between desired and actual employment:
Dejct = yjctGapjct Gapjct ´ e¤
jct ¡ejc;t¡1; (1)
where ejct and e¤
jct denote the logarithm of employment and desired employment, respectively. The random
variable yjct, which is assumed i.i.d. both across sectors and over time, takes values in the interval [0;1] and
has country-speciﬁc mean lc and variance wclc(1¡lc), with 0 · wc · 1. The case wc = 0 corresponds
to the standard quadratic adjustment model, the case wc = 1 to the Calvo (1983) model. The parameter
lc captures microeconomic ﬂexibility. As lc goes to one, all gaps are closed quickly and microeconomic
ﬂexibility is maximum. As lc decreases, microeconomic ﬂexibility declines.
Equation (1) hints at two important components of our methodology: We need to ﬁnd a measure of
the employment gap and a strategy to estimate the average (over j and t) speeds of adjustment (the lc).
We describe both ingredients in detail in what follows. In a nutshell, we construct estimates of e¤
jct, the
only unobserved element of the gap, by solving the optimization problem of a sector’s representative ﬁrm,
as a function of observables such as labor productivity and a suitable proxy for the average market wage.
We estimate lc from (1), based upon the large cross-sectional size of our sample and the well documented
heterogeneity in the realizations of the gaps and the yjct’s (see, e.g., Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger
(1997) for US evidence).
2.1.2 Details
Output and demand for a sector’s representative ﬁrm are given by:
y = a+ae+bh; (2)
p = d¡
1
h
y; (3)
2where y, p, e, a, h, d denote output, price, employment, productivity, hours worked and demand shocks, and
h is the price elasticity of demand. We let g ´ (h¡1)=h, with h > 1, 0 < a < 1, 0 < b < 1 and g < 1=a.
All variables are in logs.
Firms are competitive in the labor market but pay wages that increase with the number of hours worked:
w = ko+log(Hµ+W):
This can be approximated by:
w = wo+µ(h¡h); (4)
with wo and µ determined by ko and W, and h constant over time and interpreted below. In order to ensure
interior solutions, we assume aµ > b and µ > bg.
A key assumption is that the representative ﬁrm within each sector only faces adjustment costs when it
changes employment levels, not when it changes the number of hours worked (beyond overtime payments).5
It follows that the sector’s choice of hours in every period can be expressed in terms of its current level of
employment, by solving the corresponding ﬁrst order condition for hours.
In a frictionless labor market the ﬁrm’s employment level also satisﬁes a simple static ﬁrst order condi-
tion for employment. Our functional forms then imply that the optimal choice of hours, h, does not depend
on the employment level. A patient calculation shows that
h =
1
µ
log
µ
bW
aµ¡b
¶
:
We denote the corresponding employment level by b e and refer to it as the static employment target:
b e =C+
1
1¡ag
[d+ga¡wo];
withC a constant that depends on µ, a, b and g.
The following relation between the employment gap and the hours gap then follows:
b e¡e =
µ¡bg
1¡ag
(h¡h): (5)
This is the expression used by Caballero and Engel (1993). It is not useful in our case, since we do
not have information on worked hours. Yet the argument used to derive (5) also can be used to express the
employment gap in terms of the marginal labor productivity gap:
b e¡e =
f
1¡ag
(v¡wo);
where v denotes marginal productivity, f ´ µ=(µ¡bg) is decreasing in the elasticity of the marginal wage
5For evidence on this see Sargent (1978) and Shapiro (1986).
3schedule with respect to average hours worked, µ¡1, and wo was deﬁned in (4). Note that b e¡e is the
difference between the static target b e and realized employment, not the dynamic employment gap e¤
jct ¡ejct
related to the term on the right hand side of (1). However, if we assume that d+ga¡wo follows a random
walk (possibly with an exogenously time varying drift) —an assumption consistent with the data6 — we
have that e¤
jct is equal to b ejct plus a constant dct. It follows that
e¤
jct ¡ejct¡1 =
f
1¡agj
¡
vjct ¡wo
jct
¢
+Dejct +dct; (6)
where we have allowed for sector-speciﬁc differences in g. Note that both marginal product and wages are
in nominal terms. However, since these expressions are in logs, their difference eliminates the aggregate
price level component.
We estimate the marginal productivity of labor, vjct, using output per worker multiplied by an industry-
level labor share, assumed constant whithin income groups and over time.
Two natural candidates to proxy for wo
jct are the average (across sectors within a country, at a given
point in time) of either observed wages or observed marginal productivities. The former is consistent with a
competitive labor market, the latter may be expected to be more robust in settings with long-term contracts
and multiple forms of compensation, where the salary may not represent the actual marginal cost of labor.7
We performed estimations using both alternatives and found no discernible differences (see below). This
suggests that statistical power comes mainly from the cross-section dimension, that is, from the well docu-
mented and large magnitude of sector-speciﬁc shocks. In what follows we report the more robust alternative
and approximate wo by the average marginal productivity, which leads to:
e¤
jct ¡ejct¡1 =
f
1¡agj
(vjct ¡v¢ct)+Dejct +dct ´ Gapjct +dct; (7)
where v¢ct denotes the average, over j, of vjct, and we use this convention for other variables as well. The
expression above ignores systematic variations in labor productivity across sectors within a country, for
example, because (unobserved) labor quality may differ systematically across sectors. The presence of
such heterogeneity would tend to bias estimates of the speed of adjustment downward. To incorporate this
possibility we subtract from (vjct ¡v¢ct) in (7) a moving average of relative sectoral productivity, b qjct, where
b qjct ´
1
2
[(vjct¡1¡v¢ct¡1) + (vjct¡2¡v¢ct¡2)]:
As a robustness check, for our main speciﬁcations we also computed b qjct using a three and four periods
moving average, without signiﬁcant changes in our results (more on this when we check robustness in
6Pooling all countries and sectors together, the ﬁrst order autocorrelation of the measure of De¤
jct constructed below is ¡0:018.
Computing this correlation by country the mean value is 0.011 with a standard deviation of 0.179.
7While we have assumed a simple competitive market for the base salary (salary for normal hours) within each sector, our
procedure could easily accommodate other, more rent-sharing like, wage setting mechanisms (with a suitable reinterpretation of
some parameters, but not lc).
4Section 3.2). The resulting expression for the estimated employment-gap is:
e¤
jct ¡ejct¡1 =
f
1¡agj
(vjct ¡b qjct ¡v¢ct)+Dejct +dct ´ Gapjct +dct; (8)
where agj is constructed using the sample median of the labor share for sector j across year and income
groups.
Rearranging (8), we estimate f from
Dejct = ¡
f
1¡agj
(Dvjct ¡Dv¢ct)+kct +uit +De¤
jct ´ ¡fzjct +kct +ejct; (9)
where k is a country-year dummy, De¤
jct is the change in the desired level of employment and zjct ´
(Dvjct ¡Dv¢ct)=(1¡agj). We assume that changes in sectoral labor composition are negligible between
two consecutive years. In order to avoid the simultaneity bias present in this equation (Dv and De¤ are
clearly correlated) we estimate (9) using (Dwjct¡1¡Dw¢ct¡1) as an instrument for (Dvjct ¡Dv¢ct).8 Table 1
reports the estimation results of (9) for the full sample of countries and across income groups. The ﬁrst two
columns use the full sample, with and without two percent of extreme values for the independent variable,
respectively. The remaining columns report the estimation results for each of our three income groups and
job security groups (more on both of these measures in Section 2.2). Based on our results for the baseline
case, we set the value of f at its full sample estimate of 0:4 for all countries in our sample.
It is important to point out that our methodology has some advantages over standard partial adjustment
estimations. First, it summarizes in a single variable all shocks faced by a sector. This feature allows us to
increase precision and to study the determinants of the speed of adjustment using interaction terms. Second,
and related, it only requires data on nominal output and employment, two standard and well-measured
variables in most industrial surveys. Most previous studies on adjustment costs required measures of real
output or an exogenous measure of sector demand.9
2.1.3 Regressions
Thecentralempiricalquestionofthepresentstudyishowcross-countrydifferencesinjobsecurityregulation
affect the speed of adjustment. Accordingly, from (1) and (8) it follows that the basic equation we estimate
is:
Dejct = lct(Gapjct +dct); (10)
8We lag the instrument to deal with the simultaneity problem and use the wage rather than productivity to reduce the (potential)
impact of measurement error bias.
9Abraham and Houseman (1994), Hammermesh (1993), and Nickel and Nunziata (2000)) evaluate the differential response of
employment to observed real output. A second option is to construct exogenous demand shocks. Although this approach overcomes
the real output concerns, it requires constructing an adequate sectorial demand shock for every country. A case in point are the
papers by Burgess and Knetter (1998) and Burgess et al. (2000), which use the real exchange rate as their demand shock. The
estimated effects of the real exchange rate on employment are usually marginally signiﬁcant, and often of the opposite sign than
expected.
5where Dejct is the log change in employment and lct denotes the speed of adjustment. We assume that the
latter takes the form:
lct = l1+l2JSeff
ct ; (11)
where JSeff
ct is a measure of effective job security regulation. In practice we observe job security regulation
(imperfectly), but not the rigor with which it is enforced. We proxy the latter with a “rule of law” variable,
so that
JSeff
ct = JSct(1+aRLct); (12)
where a is a constant and RLct is a standard measure of rule of law (see below). Substituting this expression
in (11) and the resulting expression for lct in (10), yields our main estimating equation:
Dejct = l1 Gapjct +l2
¡
Gapjct £JSct
¢
+l3
¡
Gapjct £JSct £RLct
¢
+e dct +ejct; (13)
with l3 = al2 and e dct denotes country£time ﬁxed effects (proportional to the dct deﬁned above).
The main coefﬁcients of interest are l2 and l3, which measure how the speed of adjustment varies across
countries depending on their labor market regulation (both de jure and de facto).
2.2 The Data
This section describes our sample and main variables. Additional variables are deﬁned as we introduce them
later in the text.
2.2.1 Job Security and Rule of Law
We use two measures of job security, or legal protection against dismissal: the job security index constructed
by Djankov et al. (2003) for 60 countries world-wide (henceforth JSc) and the job security index constructed
by Heckman and Pages (2000) for 24 countries in OECD and Latin America (henceforth HPct). The JSc
measure is available for a larger sample of countries and includes a broader range of job security variables.
The HPct measure has the advantage of having time variation.
Our main job security index, JSc, is the sum of four variables, measured in 1997, each of which takes
on values between 0 and 1: (i) grounds for dismissal protection PGc, (ii) protection regarding dismissal
procedures PPc, (iii) notice and severance payments PSc, and (iv) protection of employment in the constitu-
tion PCc. The rules on grounds of dismissal range from allowing the employment relation to be terminated
by either party at any time (employment at will) to allowing the termination of contracts only under a very
narrow list of “fair” causes. Protective dismissal procedures require employers to obtain the authorization
of third parties (such as unions and judges) before terminating the employment contract. The third vari-
able, notice and severance payment, is the one closest to the HPct measure, and is the normalized sum of
two components: mandatory severance payments after 20 years of employment (in months) and months of
advance notice for dismissals after 20 years of employment (NStc = bct+20+SPct+20; t = 1997). The four
6components of JSc described above increase with the level of job security.
The Heckman and Pages measure is narrower, including only those provisions that have a direct impact
on the costs of dismissal. To quantify the effects of this legislation, they construct an index that computes
the expected (at hiring) cost of a future dismissal. The index includes both the costs of advanced notice
legislation and ﬁring costs, and is measured in units of monthly wages.
Our estimations also adjust for the level of enforcement of labor legislation. We do this by including
measures of rule of law RLc and government efﬁciency GEc from Kaufmann at al. (1999), and interact them
with JSc and HPct.10 We expect labor market legislation to have a larger impact on adjustment costs in
countries with a stronger rule of law (higher RLc) and more efﬁcient governments (higher GEc).
The institutional variables as well as the countries in our sample and their corresponding income group
are reported in Table 2. Table 3 reports the sample correlations between our main cross-country variables
and summary statistics for each of these measures for three income groups (based on World Bank per capita
income categories).11 As expected, the correlation between the two measures of job security is positive and
signiﬁcant. Differences can be explained mainly by the broader scope of the JSct index. Also as expected,
rule of law and government efﬁciency increase with income levels. Note, however, that neither measure of
job security is positively correlated with income per capita, since both JSct and HPc are highest for middle
income countries.
2.2.2 Industrial Statistics
Our output, employment and wage data come from the 2002 3-digit UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database.
The UNIDO database contains data for the period 1963-2000 for the 28 manufacturing sectors that corre-
spond to the 3 digit ISIC code (revision 2). Because our measures of job security and rule of law are time
invariant and measured in recent years, however, we restrict our sample to the period 1980-2000. Data on
output and labor compensation are in current US dollars (inﬂation is removed through time effects in our
regressions). Throughout the paper our main dependent variable is Dejct, the log change in total employment
in sector j of country c in period t.
A large number of countries are included in the original dataset — however our sample is constrained
by the cross-country availability of the independent variables measuring job security. In addition, we drop
two percent of extreme employment changes in each of the three income groups. For our main speciﬁcation
the resulting sample includes 60 economies. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the dependent variable
by income group.
10For rule of law and government efﬁciency we use the earliest value available in the Kaufmann et al. (1999) database: 1996,
since this is closest to the Djankov et al. (2003) measure, which is for 1997.
11Income groups are: 1=High Income OECD, 2=High Income Non OECD and Upper Middle Income, 3=Lower Middle Income
and Low Income.
73 Results
This section presents our main result, showing that effective job security has a signiﬁcant negative effect on
the speed of adjustment of employment to shocks in the employment-gap. It also presents several robustness
exercises.
3.1 Main results
Recall that our main estimating equation is:
Dejct = l1 Gapjct +l2
¡
Gapjct £JSc
¢
+l3
¡
Gapjct £JSc£RLc
¢
+e dct +ejct: (14)
Note that we have dropped time subscripts from JSc and RLc as we only use time invariant measures of
rule of law and job security in our baseline estimation. Note also that in all speciﬁcations that include the
(Gapict £JSct £RLc) interaction we also include the respective Gapict £RLc as a control variable.
We start by ignoring the effect of job security on the speed of adjustment, and set l2 and l3 equal
to zero. This gives us an estimate of the average speed of adjustment and is reported in column 1 of
Table 4. On average (across countries and periods) we ﬁnd that 60% of the employment-gap is closed in
each period. Furthermore, our measure of the employment-gap and country£year ﬁxed effects explain 60%
of the variance in log-employment growth.
The next three columns present our main results, which are repeated in columns 5 to 7 allowing for
different l1 by sectors and country income level.12 Column 2 (and 5) presents our estimate of l2. This
coefﬁcient has the right sign and is signiﬁcant at conventional conﬁdence levels. Employment adjusts more
slowly to shocks in the employment-gap in countries with higher levels of ofﬁcial job security.
Next, we allow for a distinction between effective and ofﬁcial job security. Results are reported in
columns 3 and 4 (and, correspondingly, 6 and 7) for different rules-enforcement criteria. In columns 3 and
6 the distinction between effective and ofﬁcial job security is captured by the product of JSc and DSRLc,
where DSRLc is a dummy variable for countries with strong rule of law (RLc ¸RLGreece — where Greece is
the OECD country with the lowest RL score). The three panels in Figure 1 show the value of the job security
index for countries in the high, medium and low income groups, respectively. Nowl2 becomes insigniﬁcant,
while l3 has the right sign and is highly signiﬁcant. That is, the same change in JSc will have a signiﬁcantly
larger (downward) effect on the speed of adjustment in countries with stricter enforcement of laws, as
measured by our rule-of-law dummy. The effect of the estimated coefﬁcients reported in column 3 is large.
In countries with strong rule of law, moving from the 20th percentile of job security (¡0:19) to the 80th
percentile (0:23) reduces ˆ l by 0:22. The same change in job security legislation has a considerable smaller
effect, 0:006, on the speed of adjustment in the group of economies with weak rule of law. Employment
12We allow for an interaction between Gapjct and 3 digit ISIC sector dummies (we also include sector ﬁxed effects). We also
control for the possibility that our results are driven by omitted variables, correlated with our measures of job security. For this, we
include an additional interaction between Gapjct and three income-group dummies.
8adjustsmoreslowlytoshocksintheemployment-gapincountrieswithhigherlevelsofeffectivejobsecurity.
Columns 4 and 7 address whether the negative coefﬁcient on l3 is robust to other measures of legal
enforcement. To do so we use an alternative variable from the Kaufmann et al. (1999) dataset – government
effectiveness (GE) – and construct a dummy variable for high effectiveness countries (GEc ¸GEGreece).
Clearly, the results are very close to those reported in columns 3 and 7. Job security legislation has a
signiﬁcant negative effect on the estimated speed of adjustment when governments are effective – a proxy
for enforcement of existing labor regulation.
Finally, thelastcolumninTable4usesanalternativemeasureofjobsecurity. Werepeatourspeciﬁcation
from column 7 (including sector and income dummies) using the Heckman-Pages (2000) measure of job
security. The HPct data are only available for countries in the OECD and Latin America so our sample
size is reduced by half, and most low income countries are dropped. The ﬂip side is that this measure is
time varying which potentially allows us to capture the effects of changes in the job security regulation. As
reported in column 8, we ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant effect of HPct on the speed of adjustment.
3.2 Further robustness
We continue our robustness exploration by assessing the impact of three broad econometric issues: alterna-
tive gap-measures, exclusion of potential (country) outliers, and misspeciﬁcation due to endogeneity of the
gap measure.
3.2.1 Alternative gap-measures
Table 4 suggests that conditional on our measure of the employment-gap, our main ﬁndings are robust: job
security, whenenforced, hasasigniﬁcantnegativeimpactonthespeedofadjustmenttotheemployment-gap.
Table 5 tests the robustness of this result to alternative measures of the employment-gap. Columns 1 and 2
relax the assumption of a f common across all countries. They repeat our baseline speciﬁcations —columns
2 and 3 in Table 4— using the values of f estimated per income-group reported in Table 1. In turn, columns
3 and 4 report the results of using values of f estimated across countries grouped by level of job security.13
Next, columns 5 through 8 repeat our baseline speciﬁcations using a three and four period moving average
to estimate b qjct. The ﬁnal two columns (9 and 10) use an alternative speciﬁcation for wo
jct based on average
wages instead of average productivity (see equation 8) to build Gapjct. In all of the speciﬁcations reported
in Table 5, our results remain qualitatively the same as in Table 4.
3.2.2 Exclusion of potential (country) outliers
Table 6 reports estimates of l2 and l3 using the speciﬁcation from column 3 in Table 4 but dropping one
country from our sample at a time. In all cases the estimated coefﬁcient on l3 is negative and signiﬁcant at
conventional conﬁdence intervals.
13Countries are grouped into the upper, middle and lower thirds of job security.
9However, it is also apparent in this table that excluding either Hong Kong or Kenya makes a substantial
difference in the point estimates. For this reason, we re-estimate our model from scratch (that is, from f
up) now excluding these two countries. In this case the value of f rises from 0.40 to 0.42. Qualitatively,
however, the main results remain unchanged. Table 7 reports these results.
3.2.3 Potential endogeneity of the gap measure
One concern with our procedure is that the construction of the gap measure includes the change in employ-
ment. While this does not represent a problem under the null hypothesis of the model, any measurement
error in employment and fzjt could introduce important biases. We address this issue with two procedures.
Before describing these procedures, we note that the standard solution of passing the De-component of
the gap deﬁned in (8) to the left hand side of the estimating equation (10) does not work in our context.
Passing De to the left suggests that the coefﬁcient on the resulting gap will be equal to l=(1¡l). As
shown in Appendix A, this holds only in the case of a partial adjustment model (w = 0 in the notation of
Section 2.1). By contrast, in the case of a Calvo-type adjustment (w=1), the corresponding coefﬁcient will,
on average, be negative.14 More important, even small departures from a partial adjustment model (small
values of w) introduce signiﬁcant biases when estimating l using this approach.
Next we turn to the two procedures. The ﬁrst procedure maintains our baseline speciﬁcation, but in-
struments for the contemporaneous gap measure. Given that Gapjct = fzjt +Dejct can be rewritten as
fzj;t¡1+De¤
jct, a natural instrument is the lag of the ex-post gap, fzjc;t¡1. Unfortunately, the latter is not a
valid instrument if it is computed with measurement error and this error is serially correlated. In our speci-
ﬁcation this could be the case because we use a moving average to construct the estimate of relative sectoral
productivity, b qjct. To avoid this problem, we construct an alternative measure of the ex-post gap letting wage
data play the role of productivity data when calculating the v and q terms on the right hand side of (8).
The second procedure re-writes the model in a standard dynamic panel formulation that removes the
contemporaneous employment change from the right hand side:15
DGapjct = (1¡lc)DGapjct¡1+ejct: (15)
Table 8 reports the values of the average l estimated with these two alternative, and much less precise,
procedures. For comparison purposes, the ﬁrst row reproduces the ﬁrst column in Table 4. The second row
shows the result for the IV procedure based on using lagged wages as instruments. Finally, Row 3 reports
the estimate from the dynamic panel. It is apparent from the table that the estimates of average l are in the
right ballpark, and hence we conclude that the bias due to a potentially endogenous gap is not signiﬁcant.
14In the Calvo-case, for every observation either the (modiﬁed) gap or the change in employment is zero. The former happens
when adjustment takes place, the latter when it does not. It follows that the covariance of De and the (modiﬁed) gap will be equal to
minus the product of the mean of both variables. Since these means have the same sign, the estimated coefﬁcient will be negative.
See Appendix A for a formal derivation.
15To estimate this equation we follow Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and use twice and three-times lagged values of DGapjct as
instruments for the RHS variable. Similar results are obtained if we follow Arellano and Bond (1991).
104 Gauging the Costs of Effective Labor Protection
By impairing worker movements from less to more productive units, effective labor protection reduces ag-
gregate output and slows down economic growth. In this section we develop a simple framework to quantify
this effect. Any such exercise requires strong assumptions and our approach is no exception. Nonetheless,
our ﬁndings suggest that the costs of the microeconomic inﬂexibility caused by effective protection is large.
In countries with strong rule of law, moving from the 20th to the 80th percentile of job security lowers an-
nual productivity growth somewhere between 0.9 and 1.2 percent. The same movement for countries with
low rule of law has a negligible impact on TFP.
Consider a continuum of establishments, indexed by i, that adjust labor in response to productivity
shocks, while their share of the economy’s capital remains ﬁxed over time. Their production functions
exhibit constant returns to (aggregate) capital, Kt, and decreasing returns to labor:
Yit = BitKtLa
it; (16)
where Bit denotes plant-level productivity and 0 < a < 1. The Bit’s follow geometric random walks, that
can be decomposed into the product of a common and an idiosyncratic component:
DlogBit ´ bit = vt +vI
it;
where the vt are i.i.d.N (µA;s2
A) and the vit’s are i.i.d. (across productive units, over time and with respect to
the aggregate shocks) N (0;s2
I). We set µA = 0, since we are interested in the interaction between rigidities
and idiosyncratic shocks, not in Jensen-inequality-type effects associated with aggregate shocks.
The price-elasticity of demand is h > 1. Aggregate labor is assumed constant and set equal to one. We
deﬁne aggregate productivity, At, as:
At =
Z
BitLa
itdi; (17)
so that aggregate output,Yt ´
R
Yitdi, satisﬁes
Yt = AtKt:
Units adjust with probability lc in every period, independent of their history and of what other units
do that period.16 The parameter that captures microeconomic ﬂexibility is lc. Higher values of lc are
associated with a faster reallocation of workers in response to productivity shocks.
Standard calculations show that the growth rate of output, gY, satisﬁes:
gY = sA¡d; (18)
16More precisely, whether unit i adjusts at time t is determined by a Bernoulli random variable xit with probability of success lc,
where the xit’s are independent across units and over time. This corresponds to the case w = 1 in Section 2.1.
11where s denotes the savings rate (assumed exogenous) and d the depreciation rate for capital.
Now compare two economies that differ only in their degree of microeconomic ﬂexibility, lc;1 < lc;2.
Tedious but straightforward calculations relegated to Appendix B show that:
gY;2¡gY;1 ' (gY;1+d)
·
1
lc;1
¡
1
lc;2
¸
q; (19)
with
q =
ag(2¡ag)
2(1¡ag)2 s2;
g = (h¡1)=h, s2 = s2
I +s2
A.17
We choose parameters to apply (19) as follows: The mark-up is set at 20% (so that g = 5=6), gY;1 to the
average rate of growth per worker in our sample for the 1980-1990 period, 0.7%, s = 27%,18 a = 2=3, and
d = 6%.
Table 9 reports estimated speeds of adjustment across countries. Table 10 reports the average annual
productivity costs of the deviation between each quintile and the bottom quintile in estimated speed of
adjustment. These numbers are large. More important, they imply that moving from the 20th to the 80th
percentile in job security, in countries with strong rule of law, reduces annual productivity growth by 0:86%.
The same change in job security legislation has a much smaller effect on TFP growth, 0.02%, in the group
of economies with weak rule of law.
We are fully aware of the many caveats that such ceteris-paribus comparison can raise, but the point of
the table is to provide an alternative metric of the potential signiﬁcance of observed levels of effective labor
protection. Moreover, these numbers are roughly consistent with what we obtain when running a regression
of productivity growth on the estimated lc’s for all the economies in our sample from 1980 to 1990 (see
Table 11 and Figure 2). Focusing on the results controlling for income groups (column 3), the coefﬁcient on
lc is around 0.05 and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Combining these estimates with those in Column 3
of Table 4 implies that when moving from the 20th to the 80th percentile in job security, annual TFP growth
falls by as much as 1.18% in countries with high rule of law. In contrast, a similar improvement in labor
regulation in countries with low rule law reduces TFP growth by only 0.03%.
5 Concluding Remarks
Many papers have shown that, in theory, job security regulation depresses ﬁrm level hiring and ﬁring de-
cisions. Job security provisions increase the cost of reducing employment and therefore lead to fewer dis-
17There also is a (static) jump in the level of aggregate productivity when l increases, given by:
A2¡A1
A1
'
·
1
l1
¡
1
l2
¸
q:
See Appendix B for the proof.
18This is the average across the ﬁve countries considered in Caballero et al. (2004).
12missals when ﬁrms are faced with negative shocks. Conversely, when faced with a positive shock, the
optimal employment response takes into account the fact that workers may have to be ﬁred in the future, and
the employment response is smaller. The overall effect is a reduction of the speed of adjustment to shocks.
However, conclusive empirical evidence on the effects of job security regulation has been elusive. One
important reason for this deﬁcit has been the lack of information on employment regulation for a sufﬁciently
large number of economies that can be integrated to cross sectional data on employment outcomes. In this
paper we have developed a simple empirical methodology that has allowed us to ﬁll some of the empiri-
cal gap by exploiting: (a) the recent publication of two cross-country surveys on employment regulations
(Heckman and Pages (2000) and Djankov et al. (2003)) and, (b) the homogeneous data on employment and
production available in the UNIDO dataset. Another important reason for the lack of empirical success is
differences in the degree of regulation enforcement across countries. We address this problem by interacting
the measures of employment regulation with different proxies for law-enforcement.
Using a dynamic labor demand speciﬁcation we estimate the effects of job security across a sample of
60 countries for the period from 1980 to 1998. We consistently ﬁnd a relatively lower speed of adjustment
of employment in countries with high legal protection against dismissal, especially when such protection is
likely to be enforced.
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15APPENDICES
A Endogeneity of the Gap Measure
The model is the one described in Section 2.1. Ignoring country differences and ﬁxing t,19 we have that
Dej = yjxj; (20)
where xj ´ e¤
jt ¡ej;t¡1 and the y are i.i.d., independent of the xi, with mean l and variance wl(1¡l),
0 · w · 1. It follows from (20) that:
Dej = lxj +uj; (21)
with uj ´ (yj ¡l)xj satisfying the properties of an error term in a standard regression setting. Thus, if we
observe the Dej and xj and estimate (21), we obtain an unbiased and consistent estimator for l.20
Removing De from the gap measure is equivalent to replacing xj by zj ´ xj ¡Dej in (21). It is obvious
that zj = 0 when y = 1 and Dej = 0 when yj = 0. Since the two values yj takes in the Calvo case (w = 1)
are 0 and 1, we have that when estimating the regression coefﬁcient via OLS the covariance in the numerator
will be equal to minus the product of the average of Dej and the average of the zj. Since both averages have
the same sign, it follows that the regression coefﬁcient will be negative (or zero if both averages are equal to
zero).
Since we are considering sectoral data, the case w = 1 may seem somewhat extreme. The following
proposition shows that even for small departures from the partial adjustment case, the bias is likely to be
signiﬁcant.
Proposition 1 Consider the setting described above. Denote by ˆ b the OLS estimate of the cofﬁcient b in
Dej = const+bzj +error:
Denote by µ and s2 the (theoretical) mean and variance of the xj’s. Then:
plimN!¥ˆ b =
(1¡w)s2¡wµ2
[1¡(1¡w)l]s2+wlµ2l: (22)
Proof From Dej = yjxj and zj = (1¡yj)xj it follows that:
Cov(De;z) =
1
Nå
i
yi(1¡yi)x2
i ¡
Ã
1
Nå
i
yixi
!Ã
1
Nå
i
(1¡yi)xi
!
;
19The latter is justiﬁed by the fact that most of our identiﬁcation comes from cross-sectional variation.
20This, in a nutshell, is the essence of the estimation procedure described in detail in Section 2 of the main text, with xj corre-
sponding to the gap measure deﬁned in (8).
16and
Var(z) =
1
Nå
i
(1¡yi)2x2
i ¡
"
1
Nå
i
(1¡yi)xi
#2
:
Taking expectations over the yi, conditional on the xi, and letting N tend to inﬁnity leads to:
E[ˆ b] =
E[y(1¡y)](s2+µ2)¡l(1¡l)µ2
E[(1¡y)2](s2+µ2)¡(1¡l)2µ2 :
The result now follows from the expression above and the fact that:
E[y(1¡y)] = (1¡w)l(1¡l);
E[(1¡y)2] = [1¡(1¡w)l](1¡l):
It follows that plimN!¥ˆ b is decreasing in w, varying from l=(1¡l) when w = 0 to ¡lµ2=(s2+lµ2)
when w = 1. It also follows that plimN!¥ˆ b is decreasing in jµj, so that:
plimN!¥ˆ b ·
(1¡w)l
1¡(1¡w)l
:
B Gauging the Costs
In this appendix we derive (19). From (18) and (19) it follows that it sufﬁces to show that under the assump-
tions in Section 4 we have:
A2¡A1
A1
'
·
1
l1
¡
1
l2
¸
q; (23)
where we have dropped the subindex c from the l and
q =
ag(2¡ag)
2(1¡ag)2 (s2
I +s2
A); (24)
with g = (h¡1)=h.
The intuition is easier if we consider the following, equivalent, problem. The economy consists of a very
large and ﬁxed number of ﬁrms (no entry or exit). Production by ﬁrm i during period t is Yi;t = Ai;tLa
i;t,21
while(inverse)demandforgoodiinperiodt isPi;t =Y
¡1=h
i;t , whereAi;t denotesproductivityshocks, assumed
to follow a geometric random walk, so that
DlogAi;t ´ Dai;t = vA
t +vI
i;t;
21That is, we ignore hours in the production function.
17with vA
t i.i.d. N (0;s2
A) and vI
i;t i.i.d. N (0;s2
I). Hence Dai;t follows a N (0;s2
T), with s2
T = s2
A +s2
I. We
assume the wage remains constant throughout.
In what follows lower case letters denote the logarithm of upper case variables. Similarly, ¤-variables
denote the frictionless counterpart of the non-starred variable.
Solving the ﬁrm’s maximization problem in the absence of adjustment costs leads to:
Dl¤
i;t =
g
1¡ag
Dai;t; (25)
and hence
Dy¤
i;t =
1
1¡ag
Dai;t: (26)
Denote byY¤
t aggregate production in period t if there were no frictions. It then follows from (26) that:
Y¤
i;t = etDai;tY¤
i;t¡1; (27)
with t ´ 1=(1¡ag), Taking expectations (over i for a particular realization of vA
t ) on both sides of (27) and
noting that both terms being multiplied on the r.h.s. are, by assumption, independent (random walk), yields
Y¤
t = e
tvA
t + 1
2t2s2
IY¤
t¡1; (28)
Averaging over all possible realizations of vA
t (these ﬂuctuations are not the ones we are interested in for the
calculation at hand) leads to
Y¤
t = e
1
2t2s2
TY¤
t¡1;
and therefore for k = 1;2;3;::::
Y¤
t = e
1
2kt2s2
TY¤
t¡k: (29)
Denote:
² Yt;t¡k: aggregate Y that would attain in period t if ﬁrms had the frictionless optimal levels of labor
corresponding to period t ¡k. This is the averageY for units that last adjusted k periods ago.
² Yi;t;t¡k: the corresponding level of production of ﬁrm i in t.
From the expressions derived above it follows that:
Yi;t;t¡1
Y¤
i;t
=
Ã
L¤
i;t¡1
L¤
i;t
!a
= e¡agtDai;t;
and therefore
Yi;t;t¡1 = eDai;tY¤
i;t¡1:
18Taking expectations (with respect to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks) on both sides of the latter expres-
sion (here we use that Dai;t is independent ofY¤
i;t¡1) yields
Yt;t¡1 = e
1
2s2
TY¤
t¡1;
which combined with (29) leads to:
Yt;t¡1 = e
1
2(1¡t2)s2
TY¤
t :
A derivation similar to the one above, leads to:
Yi;t;t¡k = eDai;t+Dai;t¡1+:::+Dai;t¡k+1Y¤
t¡k;
which combined with (29) gives:
Yt;t¡k = e¡kqY¤
t ; (30)
with q deﬁned in (24).
Assuming Calvo-type adjustment with probability l, we decompose aggregate production into the sum
of the contributions of cohorts:
Yt = lY¤
t +l(1¡l)Yt;t¡1+l(1¡l)2Yt;t¡2+:::
Substituting (30) in the expression above yields:
Yt =
l
1¡(1¡l)e¡qY¤
t : (31)
It follows that the production gap, deﬁned as:
Prod. Gap ´
Y¤
t ¡Yt
Y¤
t
;
is equal to:
Prod. Gap =
(1¡l)(1¡e¡q)
1¡(1¡l)e¡q : (32)
A ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion then shows that, when jqj << 1:
Prod. Gap '
(1¡l)
l
q: (33)
Subtracting this gap evaluated at l1 from its value evaluated at l2, and noting that this gap difference
corresponds to (A2¡A1)=A1 in the main text, yields (23) and therefore concludes the proof.
19Figure 1: Job Security and Rule of Law in Countries with High, Medium and Low Income
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20Figure 2: Productivity Growth and Speed of Adjustment
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21Table 1: ESTIMATING f
Speciﬁcation: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Change in Employment (ln)
zjct ¡0:280 ¡0:394 ¡0:558 ¡0:355 ¡0:387 ¡0:363 ¡1:168 ¡0:352
(0.044) (0.068) (0.135) (0.119) (0.116) (0.091) (.357) (0.103)
Observations 22,810 22,008 8,311 6,378 7,319 7,730 6,883 7,036
Income Group All All 1 2 3 All All All
Job Sec. Group All All All All All 1 2 3
Extreme obs. of instrument Yes No No No No No No No
Standard errors reported in parentheses. All estimates are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. All regressions use lagged Dwict ¡Dw¢ct as
instrumental variable. As described in the main text, zjct represents the log-change of the nominal marginal productivity of labor
in each sector, minus the country average, divided by one minus the estimated labor share. All regressions includes a country-year
ﬁxed effect (kct in (9)). Income groups are 1: High Income OECD, 2: High Income Non OECD and Upper Middle Income, and 3:
Lower Middle Income and Low Income. Job Security Groups correspond to the highest, middle an lowest third of the measure in
Djankov et al. (2003).
22Table 2: SAMPLE COVERAGE AND MAIN VARIABLES
Job Security Institutions
WDI code Inc Group Djankov et. al HP Strong RL Rule of Law Gov. Eff. High Gov. Eff
AUS 1 ¡0:19 ¡0:71 1 1.03 0.95 1
AUT 1 ¡0:15 ¡0:65 1 1.13 0.92 1
BEL 1 ¡0:11 ¡0:70 1 0.81 0.81 1
CAN 1 ¡0:16 ¡1:64 1 1.02 0.92 1
DEU 1 0.17 ¡1:56 1 1.04 0.92 1
DNK 1 ¡0:21 1 1.17 1.02 1
ESP 1 0.17 1.29 1 0.41 0.64 1
FIN 1 0.24 ¡0:82 1 1.22 0.89 1
FRA 1 ¡0:02 ¡1:09 1 0.81 0.78 1
GBR 1 ¡0:13 ¡1:00 1 1.09 1.05 1
GRC 1 ¡0:04 ¡1:05 1 ¡0:01 ¡0:06 1
IRL 1 ¡0:21 ¡1:40 1 0.92 0.82 1
ITA 1 ¡0:09 0.79 1 0.09 0.05 1
JPN 1 ¡0:14 ¡1:84 1 0.76 0.46 1
NLD 1 0.04 ¡1:53 1 1.09 1.25 1
NOR 1 ¡0:03 ¡1:55 1 1.23 1.13 1
NZL 1 ¡0:29 ¡2:21 1 1.22 1.25 1
PRT 1 0.37 2.05 1 0.53 0.24 1
SWE 1 0.06 ¡0:50 1 1.17 0.97 1
USA 1 ¡0:25 ¡2:43 1 0.95 1.01 1
ARG 2 0.11 0.56 0 ¡0:48 ¡0:37 0
BRA 2 0.36 0.61 0 ¡1:00 ¡0:82 0
CHL 2 ¡0:02 0.21 1 0.44 0.32 1
HKG 2 ¡0:32 1 0.86 0.81 1
ISR 2 ¡0:17 1 0.36 0.42 1
KOR 2 ¡0:07 1.14 1 0.02 ¡0:15 0
MEX 2 0.38 0.73 0 ¡0:86 ¡0:85 0
MYS 2 ¡0:24 1 0.05 0.18 1
PAN 2 0.34 1.37 0 ¡0:50 ¡1:19 0
SGP 2 ¡0:22 1 1.26 1.41 1
TUR 2 ¡0:13 1.54 0 ¡0:73 ¡0:69 0
TWN 2 0.01 1 0.21 0.49 1
URY 2 ¡0:30 ¡0:20 0 ¡0:26 ¡0:17 0
VEN 2 0.31 4.29 0 ¡1:38 ¡1:32 0
ZAF 2 ¡0:17 0 ¡0:42 ¡0:40 0
BFA 3 ¡0:10 0 ¡1:46 ¡1:38 0
BOL 3 0.24 2.32 0 ¡1:37 ¡1:12 0
COL 3 0.29 1.17 0 ¡1:19 ¡0:61 0
ECU 3 0.34 0.97 0 ¡1:13 ¡1:29 0
EGY 3 0.13 0 ¡0:53 ¡0:99 0
GHA 3 ¡0:17 0 ¡0:86 ¡0:78 0
IDN 3 0.10 0 ¡1:09 ¡0:55 0
IND 3 ¡0:14 0 ¡0:77 ¡0:79 0
JAM 3 ¡0:20 ¡0:44 0 ¡0:95 ¡1:06 0
JOR 3 0.22 0 ¡0:56 ¡0:54 0
KEN 3 ¡0:16 0 ¡1:48 ¡1:13 0
LKA 3 0.09 0 ¡0:48 ¡0:93 0
MAR 3 ¡0:22 0 ¡0:57 ¡0:73 0
MDG 3 0.23 0 ¡1:55 ¡1:39 0
MOZ 3 0.38 0 ¡1:92 ¡1:23 0
MWI 3 0.11 0 ¡0:94 ¡1:32 0
NGA 3 ¡0:07 0 ¡1:89 ¡1:68 0
PAK 3 ¡0:15 0 ¡1:16 ¡1:02 0
PER 3 0.37 2.25 0 ¡1:08 ¡0:87 0
PHL 3 0.24 0 ¡0:86 ¡0:54 0
SEN 3 ¡0:04 0 ¡0:92 ¡1:04 0
THA 3 0.10 0 ¡0:29 ¡0:32 0
TUN 3 0.05 0 ¡0:69 ¡0:24 0
ZMB 3 ¡0:33 0 ¡1:08 ¡1:44 0
ZWE 3 ¡0:13 0 ¡0:97 ¡0:86 0
23Table 3: BASELINE SAMPLE STATISTICS¤
Employment Growth (Yearly Avge.): 1980-2000
Inc. Group Obs. Mean SD Min Max
1 8,607 ¡0:01 0.06 ¡0:24 0.26
2 6,063 0.00 0.11 ¡0:43 0.42
3 7,063 0.02 0.16 ¡0:78 0.96
Total 21,733 0.00 0.11 ¡0:78 0.96
Job Security from Djankov et al. (2003): JS
Inc. Group Countries Mean SD Min Max
1 20 ¡0:05 0.18 ¡0:29 0.37
2 15 ¡0:01 0.25 ¡0:32 0.38
3 25 0.05 0.21 ¡0:33 0.38
Total 60 0.00 0.21 ¡0:33 0.38
Job Security from Heckman and Pages (2001): HP
Inc. Group Countries Mean SD Min Max
1 19 ¡0:87 1.15 ¡2:43 2.05
2 9 1.14 1.30 ¡0:20 4.29
3 5 1.26 1.13 ¡0:44 2.32
Total 33 0.00 1.54 ¡2:43 4.29
Rule of Law from Kaufmann et al. (1999): RL
Inc. Group Countries Mean SD Min Max
1 20 0.88 0.37 ¡0:01 1.23
2 15 ¡0:16 0.72 ¡1:38 1.26
3 25 ¡1:03 0.42 ¡1:92 ¡0:29
Total 60 ¡0:18 0.96 ¡1:92 1.26
Government Effectiveness from Kaufmann et al. (1999): GE
Inc. Group Countries Mean SD Min Max
1 20 0.80 0.37 ¡0:06 1.25
2 15 ¡0:16 0.76 ¡1:32 1.41
3 25 ¡0:95 0.36 ¡1:68 ¡0:24
Total 60 ¡0:17 0.90 ¡1:68 1.41
Correlation Country Means
JS HP RL GE
JS 1.00
HP 0.66 1.00
RL ¡0:36 ¡0:77 1.00
GE ¡0:35 ¡0:77 0.97 1.00
¤Income groups are: 1=High Income OECD, 2=High In-
come Non OECD and Upper Middle Income, 3=Lower Mid-
dle Income and Low Income.
24Table 4: ESTIMATION RESULTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Change in Log-Employment
Gap (l1) 0.600 0.603 0.607 0.611
(0.009)¤¤¤ (0.008)¤¤¤ (0.012)¤¤¤ (0.012)¤¤¤
Gap£JS (l2): ¡0:080 ¡0:015 ¡0:025 ¡0:126 ¡0:027 ¡0:038
(0.037)¤¤ (0.051) (0.051) (0.041)¤¤¤ (0.052) (0.051)
Gap£JS£DSRL (l3) ¡0:514 ¡0:314
(0.068)¤¤¤ (0.070)¤¤¤
Gap£JS£DHGE (l3) ¡0:515 ¡0:326
(0.068)¤¤¤ (0.071)¤¤¤
Gap£HP (l2) ¡0:022
(0.007)¤¤¤
Controls
Gap£Dummy High RL ¡0:076 0.086
(0.015)¤¤¤ (0.023)¤¤¤
Gap£Dummy High GE ¡0:091 0.045
(0.015)¤¤¤ (0.023)¤
Observations 21,733 21,733 21,733 21,733 21,733 21,733 21,733 12,012
R-squared 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62
Gap-Income Interaction No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gap-Sector Interaction No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. JS and HP stand for the Djankov et al.
(2003) and Heckman and Pages (2000) job security measures, respectively. DSRL and DHGE stand for strong Rule of Law and high Government
Efﬁciency dummies (in both cases the threshold is given by Greece, see the main text), respectively, using the Kaufmann et al. (1999) indices. Each
regression has country-year ﬁxed effects. Gaps are estimated using a constant f = 0:40. Sample excludes the upper and lower 1% of De and of the
estimated values of Gap.
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26Table 6: EXCLUDING ONE COUNTRY AT A TIME
l2 l3 l2 l3
Country Coeff. St. Dev. Coeff. St. Dev. Country Coeff. St. Dev. Coeff. St. Dev.
ARG ¡0:01 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07 KOR ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:52 0.07
AUS ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:52 0.07 LKA ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07
AUT ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:52 0.07 MAR ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07
BEL ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:52 0.07 MDG ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07
BFA ¡0:03 0.05 ¡0:50 0.07 MEX 0:00 0.05 ¡0:53 0.07
BOL 0:00 0.05 ¡0:52 0.07 MOZ 0:02 0.05 ¡0:55 0.07
BRA ¡0:01 0.05 ¡0:52 0.07 MWI ¡0:01 0.05 ¡0:52 0.07
CAN ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:52 0.07 NYS ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:46 0.07
CHL ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:53 0.07 NGA 0:00 0.05 ¡0:53 0.07
COL ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07 NLD ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07
DEU ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:52 0.07 NOR ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07
DNK ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:52 0.07 NZL ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:53 0.07
ECU ¡0:03 0.05 ¡0:50 0.07 PAK 0:02 0.05 ¡0:55 0.07
EGY ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07 PAN ¡0:01 0.05 ¡0:52 0.07
ESP ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:53 0.07 PER 0:06 0.05 ¡0:59 0.07
FIN ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:54 0.07 PHL ¡0:03 0.05 ¡0:50 0.07
FRA ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07 PRT ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:54 0.07
GBR ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07 SEN 0:00 0.05 ¡0:53 0.07
GHA ¡0:05 0.05 ¡0:48 0.07 SGP ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:52 0.07
GRC ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07 SWE ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:53 0.07
HKG ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:37 0.07 THA ¡0:01 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07
IDN ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07 TUN ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07
IND 0:01 0.05 ¡0:54 0.07 TUR ¡0:03 0.05 ¡0:50 0.07
IRL ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:54 0.07 TWN ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:49 0.07
ISR ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:52 0.07 URY ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:50 0.07
ITA ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07 USA ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:53 0.07
JAM ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07 VEN 0:00 0.05 ¡0:53 0.07
JOR ¡0:04 0.05 ¡0:49 0.07 ZAF ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07
JPN ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:52 0.07 ZMB ¡0:02 0.05 ¡0:51 0.07
KEN ¡0:15 0.05 ¡0:38 0.07 ZWE 0:03 0.05 ¡0:55 0.07
This table reports the estimated coefﬁcients for l2 and l3, for the speciﬁcation in Column 3 of Table 4, leaving out
one country (the one indicated for each set of coefﬁcients) at at time.
27Table 7: ESTIMATION RESULTS EXCLUDING HONG KONG AND KENYA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Change in Log-Employment
Gap (l1) 0.615 0.620 0.649 0.652
(0.009)¤¤¤ (0.009)¤¤¤ (0.012)¤¤¤ (0.012)¤¤¤
Gap£JS (l2): ¡0:105 ¡0:156 ¡0:163 ¡0:204 ¡0:171 ¡0:183
(0.039)¤¤¤ (0.051)¤¤¤ (0.051)¤¤¤ (0.042)¤¤¤ (0.052)¤¤¤ (0.052)¤¤¤
Gap£JS£DSRL (l3) ¡0:231 ¡0:062
(0.062)¤¤¤ (0.072)
Gap£JS£DHGE (l3) ¡0:227 ¡0:071
(0.070)¤¤¤ (0.072)
Gap£HP (l2) ¡0:021
(0.007)¤¤¤
Controls
Gap£Dummy High RL ¡0:121 0.065
(0.015)¤¤¤ (0.023)¤¤¤
Gap£Dummy High GE ¡0:136 0.023
(0.015)¤¤¤ (0.024)
Observations 20,881 20,881 20,881 20,881 20,881 20,881 20,881 12,003
R-squared 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
Gap-Income Interaction No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gap-Sector Interaction No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. JS and HP stand for the Djankov et al.
(2003) and Heckman and Pages (2000) job security measures, respectively. DSRL and DHGE stand for high (above Greece, see main text) Rule of
Law and Government Efﬁciency dummies, respectively, using the Kaufmann et al. (1999) indices. Each regression has country-year ﬁxed effects.
Gaps are estimated using a constant f = 0:42. Sample excludes the upper and lower 1% of De and of the estimated values of Gap.
28Table 8: IV ESTIMATION
Average speed of adjustment
Estimation Method Point Estimate Robust Standard Error
Baseline Model (Column 1 in Table 4 0.600 0.009
Gap instrumented with wage data 0.570 0.065
Standard dynamic panel formulation 0.543 0.078
See section 3.2.3 for details.
29Table 9: ESTIMATING COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SPEEDS OF ADJUSTMENT
Country lc;1 St. Dev. lc;2 St. Dev. Country lc;1 St. Dev. lc;2 St. Dev.
ARG 0:380 0.060 0:364 0.071 KOR 0:719 0.028 0:696 0.052
AUS 0:558 0.048 0:537 0.063 LKA 0:744 0.041 0:729 0.056
AUT 0:521 0.040 0:504 0.056 MAR 0:572 0.060 0:569 0.071
BEL 0:160 0.046 0:158 0.062 MDG 0:688 0.067 0:666 0.075
BFA 0:327 0.066 0:309 0.076 MEX 0:467 0.042 0:451 0.058
BOL 0:562 0.049 0:545 0.064 MOZ 0:414 0.111 0:370 0.122
BRA 0:385 0.067 0:346 0.078 MWI 0:499 0.095 0:437 0.094
CAN 0:565 0.038 0:547 0.055 NYS 0:750 0.032 0:723 0.053
CHL 0:631 0.045 0:618 0.061 NGA 0:782 0.094 0:754 0.102
COL 0:624 0.030 0:591 0.052 NLD 0:467 0.060 0:414 0.073
DEU 0:463 0.048 0:458 0.062 NOR 0:472 0.037 0:468 0.054
DNK 0:500 0.058 0:488 0.070 NZL 0:483 0.065 0:443 0.076
ECU 0:645 0.044 0:624 0.059 PAK 0:771 0.054 0:740 0.069
EGY 0:694 0.052 0:671 0.065 PAN 0:575 0.049 0:561 0.064
ESP 0:488 0.033 0:469 0.052 PER 0:379 0.038 0:376 0.056
FIN 0:445 0.032 0:428 0.051 PHL 0:664 0.036 0:652 0.055
FRA 0:292 0.032 0:278 0.052 PRT 0:369 0.029 0:362 0.050
GBR 0:577 0.037 0:565 0.054 SEN 0:716 0.080 0:707 0.090
GHA 0:502 0.064 0:498 0.075 SGP 0:631 0.039 0:605 0.057
GRC 0:552 0.032 0:536 0.052 SWE 0:578 0.037 0:555 0.054
HKG 0:837 0.029 0:821 0.050 THA 0:490 0.143 0:450 0.142
IDN 0:676 0.046 0:645 0.061 TUN 0:633 0.099 0:605 0.099
IND 0:746 0.051 0:736 0.067 TUR 0:506 0.031 0:475 0.051
IRL 0:516 0.031 0:488 0.051 TWN 0:406 0.037 0:379 0.056
ISR 0:606 0.040 0:592 0.057 URY 0:584 0.034 0:575 0.053
ITA 0:364 0.047 0:341 0.062 USA 0:544 0.040 0:542 0.056
JAM 0:563 0.411 0:510 0.364 VEN 0:519 0.037 0:515 0.056
JOR 0:697 0.041 0:681 0.057 ZAF 0:581 0.044 0:548 0.059
JPN 0:470 0.035 0:463 0.054 ZMB 0:482 0.095 0:457 0.106
KEN 0:224 0.038 0:201 0.055 ZWE 0:774 0.051 0:749 0.064
1st quintile 0.346 0.325
2nd quintile 0.482 0.457
3rd quintile 0.546 0.527
4th quintile 0.619 0.600
5th quintile 0.743 0.723
This table reports estimated coefﬁcients for l at the country level. A common value of f = 0:40 is used throughout.
lc;2 includes sectoral controls, while lc;1 does not.
30Table 10: PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT I
Change in lc-Quintile Change in Annual Growth Rate
1st to 2nd 0.88%
2nd to 3rd 0.29%
3rd to 4th 0.23%
4th to 5th 0.28%
1st to 5th 1.68%
Reported: change in annual growth rates associated with moving from the average adjustment speed of one quintile to the
next. Quintiles for lc from Table 9, column with sectoral controls. Calculation based on model described in Section 4 (see
equation (19)). Parameter values: g = 5=6), gY;1 = 0:007, s = 0:27 a = 2=3, and d = 0:06.
31Table 11: PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Annual Average Change in TFP 1980-1990
Speed of adjustment: 0.040 0.031 0.053 0.026 0.026 0.046
(0.018)¤¤ (0.019)¤ (0.018)¤¤¤ (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)¤¤
Constant: ¡0:016 ¡0:013 ¡0:016 ¡0:012 ¡0:012 ¡0:014
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009)¤ (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0.108 0.066 0.294 0.043 0.041 0.230
Income Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Estimation via WLS WLS WLS OLS OLS OLS
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample-
size determined by availability of TFP data. TFP growth at the country level calculated following Mankiw (1995):
TFP growth = Per-capita GDP growth - 0.3 Per-capita capital growth - 0.5 Avge. Schooling growth. The data
comes from World Penn Tables 5.6 and Barro and Lee (1996). WLS refers to weighted least squares, with
weights inversely proportional to the standard deviation of estimated lc’s. OLS refers to ordinary least squares.
32